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et al.: Matter of Ella B.

MATTER OF ELLA B.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-Neglect proceedings-due process-equal

protection-indigentparent(s) must be advised of the availability of
free legal counsel. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 834 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1972).
In Matter of Ella B. the New York Court of Appeals held that an
indigent parent has a right to assigned counsel in all child neglect
proceedings and must be advised of this right by the court.' The case
commenced when the Commissioner of Social Services of Westchester
County filed a petition in the Family Court charging the respondentmother, Jeri B., with neglect of her three-year-old daughter. In the
petition it was alleged that the parent had left her child alone at
home, harnessed in a crib, from 1:00 A.M. until 4:00 A.M. During
this period a friend of the mother allegedly kidnapped and raped the
child.
A proceeding was held before the Family Court at which the petitioner was represented by the County Attorney and the respondent
appeared without counsel. The child was represented by a law guardian. The court informed the mother of the contents of the petition,
2
and then advised her as follows:
The Court: You may be represented by an attorney in this
proceeding, in which case you must obtain one yourself, and
pay for him out of your own funds, or you may waive an attor-

ney and either admit or deny the facts in the petition if you
want. Do you want an attorney?
Mrs. B.: No.
The Court: Do you admit the facts in the petition?
Mrs. B.: Yes, I do.
Immediately thereafter, the judge made a determination of neglect,
ordering that the child be placed in the custody of the petitioner.8
1. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972). The N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar
§ 343(a) (McKinney 1963), in effect at the time of the original proceeding, provided
that: "The court shall advise the parent or other person legally responsible for the
child's care of a right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing and to have
an adjournment to send for counsel and consult with him.
... § 343(a) has been
repealed. Laws of N.Y., 1970, ch. 962, § 8, eff. May 1, 1970. However, the provisions of
§ 343(a) have been incorporated into FAMILY CT. Aar § 1043(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972)
with minor changes not affecting the substance thereof. Added, Laws of N.Y., 1970,
ch. 962, § 9, eff. May 1, 1970.
2. 30 N.Y.2d at 355, 285 NE.2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S2d at 135.
3. Record, at 20. Referred to, 30 N.Y.2d at 355-56, 285 N.E.2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S.2d
at 135. It is apparent from the transcript that the mother had little comprehension of
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Shortly after the original neglect proceeding the mother obtained
the assistance of the Legal Aid Society and filed a notice of appeal.
Several months later a hearing was held on a petition by the mother
to terminate the placement of her child. During this hearing the
mother's attorney asked the Family Court judge, who had presided at
the original neglect proceeding, to strike all proceedings previously
held, and moved for a hearing de novo.4 The judge denied the motion
and refused to terminate the child's custody, continuing placement
with the Commissioner of Social Services.
The respondent-mother appealed the original determination of
neglect to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which unani,
mously affirmed the Family Court's order. 5 Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals agreed to hear the case as of right on constitutional grounds."
The basic issue that reached the Court of Appeals was whether the
Family Court should be required to advise an indigent parent charged
with child neglect, such as Jeri 13., that he or she has a right to be
represented by assigned counsel.
The County Attorney, on behalf of the Commissioner of Social
Services, argued for affirmance of the original adjudication of neglect,
contending that the respondent-appellant had been properly advised
of her right to counsel. Although recognizing that the court could
have advised the mother of the availability of free legal services, in
addition to her right to retain counsel at her own expense, the petiso absent
tioner urged that the court was under no obligation to do
7
any indication from the respondent that she was indigent.
The main point in the County Attorney's argument was that since
a neglect proceeding is civil in nature the judge is under no obligation to advise a parent, sua sponte, of any right to counsel except
the nature of the proceedings. After the judge stated that he was going "to continue
the child in the custody of the Child Protective Services," the mother inquired of the
court: "[i]s it all right if I take her home?" Record at 22. Judge Fuld noted this in
the opinion, adding that "after the judge indicated that the child was to be taken
from her, she made a feeble, and unsuccessful, attempt to set forth circumstances
which might have provided a basis for a meritorious defense in the hands of an attorney." 30 N.Y.2d at 356, 285 N.E.2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S2d at 135,
4. Case No. N-105-69 (Farn. Ct., Westchester County, Order of Oct. 27, 1970),
Cerrato, J., denying motion for hearing de novo. Proceeding to terminate placement,
pursuant to NY. FAT,=y CT. Act §§ 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Referred to, 30 N.Y.2d at 356, 358, 285 NE.24 at 289, 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 135, 137.
5. 30 N.Y.2d at 353, 356, 285 N.EZ2d at 289, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 136,
6. N.Y. C.P.L.R, § 5601(b)(1) (McKinney 1963) provides that:
An Appeal may be taken to the court of appeals as of right:
1. from an order of the appellate division which finally determines an action
where there is directly involved the construction of the constitution of the
state or of the United Statcs.,...
Motion for leave to appeal granted, 29 N.Y.2d 489 (1972).
7. Brief for Petitioner-Respondent at 4.
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when set forth in the statute. The statute makes no provision for
appointed counsel in the case of indigency 8
The New York State Attorney General also entered the case, filing
a brief amicus curiae in order to defend the constitutionality of
§ 343(a) of the Family Court Act. 9 The appellant attacked this section
on the grounds that it failed to satisfy the requirements of due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While taking no position on the merits of the case, the Attorney
General argued that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
were satisfied by the referral of indigent respondents to public agencies for free counsel. "The opportunity to obtain free counsel
through legal services groups... provides a workable and effective
system of protecting the rights of respondent parents."'1
The Attorney General, however, failed to acknowledge that there
is no provision under the statute which compels the court to advise
a respondent-parent that such an opportunity actually exists. Since
the statute does not require a judge to ask a parent if he is indigent,
or advise him of the availability of counsel without cost, any referral
of indigents to free legal services, federally financed or otherwise,
would of necessity be the result of the court's own initiative rather
than compliance with the law.
Counsel for the appellant primarily sought recognition by the
Court of Appeals of the fundamental nature of the parent-child
relationship. Counsel urged: (1) that such a relationship cannot be
infringed upon unless there is basic due process, which of necessity
includes the right to assigned counsel in cases of indigency, and (2)
that the judge in the Family Court should be required to advise a
parent that this right exists."'
In addition, the appellant contended that if there is a recognizable
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel for an indigent parent
8. N.Y.

FAmIY CT.

Acr § 1043 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).

9. As the chief legal officer of the state, the Attorney General is charged with defending the constitutionality of enactments by the state legislature. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 63, 71
(McKinney 1972).
10. Brief for Attorney General as Anicus Curiae at 6. An affidavit of the Adminis.
trative Judge of the Family Court of the State of New York was submitted in support
of the Attorney General's brief, which stated that it was the practice of the New York
City Family Court to advise a parent that he might obtain free representation from a
legal services agency, or a bar association panel of attorneys, and that he did not have
to go forward with his defense until he had obtained counsel. Of course, the practice
of the Family Court in New York City was not binding on the rest of the state, since
such practice was not required by the statutory provision dealing with the parent's right
to counsel in neglect proceedings. N.Y. FAMmY CT, Acr § 1043 (a) (McKinney Supp.

1972).
11 . Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 7, 56.
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in a neglect proceeding, no valid waiver of counsel can be made
unless the parent has been specifically informed of such a right by
the court. Since the judge in the instant case had not so informed the
appellant, it was urged that there had not been a knowing or intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and therefore that the original
12
order of neglect should be vacated.
In deciding the issue affirmatively for the appellant, the Court of
Appeals held that a fundamental right is involved in all child neglect
proceedings, and that this right cannot be intruded upon by the
state unless the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection are met. Speaking for the court, Chief Judge Fuld stated
that:
A parent's concern for the liberty of the child, as well as for
his care and control, involves too fundamental an interest and
right ... [citations omitted] to be relinquished to the State
without the opportunity for a hearing, with assigned counsel
if the parent lacks the means to retain a lawyer.' 3
The court further held that failure to provide an attorney at a hearing involving such a fundamental right is a violation of due process,
and "in light of the express statutory provision for legal representation for those who can afford it, a denial of equal protection as
well." 4
The Court of Appeals indicated that another important consideration in its decision was the possibility of criminal charges being
brought against the parent after an adjudication of neglect.' 5 Further,
the court considered the issue of the individual against the state and
their relative powers. It quoted from the similar case of Cleaver v.
Wilcox as follows: 1 6 "[s]ince the state is the adversary.., there is a
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 60.
30 N.Y.2d 852, at 356-57, 285 N.E.2d 288, at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, at 136 (1972).
Id. at 357, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
In a child neglect proceeding a parent is alleged to have committed acts that

may subject him to criminal sanctions. In New York, the statute authorizes the family
court to transfer child neglect and abuse proceedings to the criminal court "if it con-

cludes, that the processes of the family court are inappropriate or insufficient"; the
statute also allows the criminal court to transfer criminal complaints of child neglect
or abuse to the family court, and states that "[n]othing in this article shall be inter-

preted to preclude concurrent proceedings in the family court and a criminal court."
(emphasis added). N.Y. FAMmY Cr. Aar § 1014 (McKinney Supp. 1972). See also, N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1967); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 681 (West 1972).
16. 40 USL.V. 2658, 2659 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972), cited at 30 N.Y.2d at 357, 285
N.E2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136. In the overwhelming majority of neglect proceed-

ings, parent-respondents are faced by institutional petitioners who are uniquely empowered to institute such hearings. A detailed study of cases processed in the Family
Court of Kings County, New York, during 1966, found that approximately 807, of the
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gross inherent imbalance of experience and expertise between the
parties if the parents are not represented by counsel." This imbalance
makes it even more essential that a parent faced with the loss of his
child be represented by counsel.
The court reasoned that the right of an indigent parent to assigned counsel in such proceedings is meaningless if the parent is not
advised of this right by the judge. Accordingly, the court found that
the mother did not knowingly or intelligently waive her right to
counsel, because the judge's statement to her that she was entitled to
counsel at her own expense was no indication to her that she would
be provided with an attorney if she could not afford one. Indeed, the
judge's statements "completely excluded the availability of assigned
counsel or other free legal assistance." 7 The court remitted the proceedings to the Family Court for a new hearing, both adjudicatory
and dispositional, at which the mother would be represented by an
18
attorney.
The holding in this case represents a significant development in
the areas of procedural due process and enforcement of equal pro.
tection under the law. The decision is one in an advancing stream
of cases that has extended the indigent's right to counsel to civil
1
cases as well as criminal actions. 0
In re Gault20 was the seminal case for the idea that the civilcriminal distinction should not be controlling. The Supreme Court
held that due process requires that a juvenile be given a right to an
proceedings are "initiated by petitioners acting in some official capacity." Note, Representation in Child-Neglect Cases:Are ParentsNeglected?, 4 COLUMt. J. LAW & Soc. PRon.
280, 256-38 (1968). The petitioners included: the Department of Social Services, the
Bureau of Attendance of the New York City Board of Education, the court clerk, probation officers, policemen, and the Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children (BSPCC). Although a private organization, the BSPCC is specifically empowered by statute to file a complaint before any court having jurisdiction for the violation of laws relating to children. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFXT CoRP. LAW § 140(b) (McKinney
1970).
17. 30 N.Y.2d 352, at 858, 285 N.E.2d 288, at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, at 137.
18. However, the Court of Appeals did not reverse or vacate the original order of
neglect entered by the Family Court on July 7, 1969. The order remained in effect
pending the outcome of the new hearing.
19. Since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963), in which the sixth amendment
right to counsel in criminal prosecutions was held to be fully applicable to the states
by the fourteenth amendment, the right to counsel has been extended to such noncriminal actions as juvenile delinquency proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
civil commitment proceedings, People ex tel Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217
N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966), Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1968),
and McCorkel v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 595, 242 A.2d 861 (1968), eviction proceedings,
Hotel Martha Washington Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1971), and
child custody proceedings, State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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attorney in a delinquency proceeding even though such a proceeding
is considered "civil" rather than "criminal." The decision in Gault
indicated that the substantive effect of an adjudication is more vital
than the label attached to it, especially when constitutional rights are
at stake. The Court concluded that when a delinquency proceeding
may result in a commitment to a state institution, such a hearing
"must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against
self-incrimination." 21
To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because
of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.... [C]om-

mitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against
one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civil."2 2
A logical extension of the reasoning in Gault is that an indigent
person must be assigned counsel in any proceeding where he faces a
possible "deprivation of liberty."

Personal incarceration is certainly not the only situation where
an individual may suffer the loss of a precious and fundamental
right. The term "liberty," as used in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, has been defined by
Mr. Justice McReynolds as:

not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
28
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Thus, if "liberty" includes the fundamental right of a parent to

raise his own children, it follows that any attempt to deprive him
of that right must conform to the requirements of due process and
equal protection. This was the rationale for the Court of Appeals
decision in the present case.
21. Id. at 49.
22. Id. at 49-50.
23. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922). Here, the Court held invalid a
statute forbidding the teaching of any language except English in any private, denominational, parochial or public school in Nebraska. This decision was cited by the
appellant in the instant case in support of the argument that the right to raise one's
children is a fundamental liberty, guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Respondent-Appellant's brief at 7, 8.
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In concluding that the courts must safeguard the fundamental
right of a parent to the care and custody of his child, Fuld, C.J.,
cited two recent Supreme Court decisions that deal with the fundamental nature of the family unit and the rights of the indigent,
2
Boddie v. Connecticut 24 and Stanley v. Illinois. 5
In Boddie the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that due
process of law must be applied to judicial proceedings that determine
the legal status of a fundamental relationship. Since the plaintiffs
were unable to pay for court fees and service of process in divorce
actions, the Court ruled that the Connecticut statute effectively prevented the poor from using the divorce courts of that state. In the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that courts are the sole
means for resolving marital disputes in an action for divorce; denial
to the indigent of "full access" to the courts, therefore, was a violation
of due process.2 6 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan
reasoned that the statute was a violation of equal protection as well,
stating that, ".. . Connecticut does not deny a hearing to everyone in
these circumstances; it denies it only to people who fail to pay certain
fees."

27

In Stanley the Court stated: 2
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful contervailing interest, protection....
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of
the family. The rights to conceive and raise one's children
have been deemed "essential" ....
The integrity of the family
unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ... the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,... and the Ninth Amendment.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Matter of Ella B., determined that the New York statute violated concepts of due process
and equal protection. By failing to provide for assigned counsel in
neglect hearings, the statute denied to indigents the opportunity to
fully participate in a proceeding involving a fundamental relationship.
24. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

25. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
26. 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971).
27. Id. at 388 (Justice Brennan, concurring in part).
28. 405,U.S. 645, 651 (1972). For a detailed discussion see Recent Decisions, Stanley
v. Illinois, this volume.
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CONCLUSION

The practical implementation of this decision may be more difficult than is at first apparent. For example, it is not unreasonable to
assume that there will be substantial questions as to who will pay for
assigned counsel in neglect hearings (private agencies, or the county,
city, state, or federal governments). In at least one instance, a legal
services agency funded by the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity has taken the position that it cannot represent indigent persons
in cases where it has been held that the Constitution requires the
state to furnish counsel. 29 Thus, when one governmental agency
must assume the burden of providing counsel to indigents, another
one declares its intention to abdicate the same responsibility.
In addition, conflicts of interest might prevent Legal Aid Society
attorneys from representing indigent parents in neglect proceedings
if, as is usually the case, the child involved is represented by a law
30
guardian who is a Legal Aid employee.
However, any difficulty involved in providing counsel to indigent
parents is amply justified when consideration is given to the fundamental nature of the interest at stake in a neglect proceeding. The
Court's decision insures that no child will be taken away from the
custody of his parent solely because the parent is unable to respond to
allegations and evidence of neglect without counsel.31
The holding in Matter of Ella B. represents a strong affirmation
of the primacy of the parental relationship, and implicit recognition
of the fact that one may be deprived of a fundamental liberty without
suffering personal detention or confinement. In deciding whether
the Constitution mandates the assignment of counsel in a civil proceeding, the determinative factor should continue to be whether the
absence of an attorney will deprive the litigant of his right to a
fundamentally fair hearing and equal protection under the law.
29. Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 5.
30. Id.
31. A study conducted in New York City indicated that, in a significant number of
cases against unrepresented parents, findings of neglect were heavily influenced by the
absence of counsel. Note, Representation in Child-Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?
4 COLUm. J. LAiW & Soc. PROB. 230, 241 (1968).
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